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Jessica Zagier Wallace, Esquire  (Argued) 
Carlton Fields 
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Miami, FL  33131 
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Eric H. Holder, Jr.  
    Attorney General 
Stuart F. Delery 
    Acting Assistant Attorney General 
    Civil Division 
Thomas B. Fatouros  (Argued) 
    Senior Litigation Counsel 
Janette L. Allen, Esquire 
Thomas W. Hussey, Esquire 
Aaron R. Petty, Esquire 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC  20044 
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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Rafael Corporan petitions for review of an Immigration Judge‟s (“IJ”) order 
finding him removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  We grant in part, deny in part, and remand the 
case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  
I. 
 In 2009, Corporan, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and lawful permanent 
resident of the United States, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371.  He was sentenced to five months‟ imprisonment and ordered to pay 
restitution (along with a co-conspirator) of $47,299.  Following that conviction, the 
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Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) charged Corporan as removable as an alien 
convicted of an “aggravated felony” defined in INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43).  Specifically, DHS contended that he committed an offense that 
“involve[d] fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceed[ed] 
$10,000,”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  Corporan filed a motion for termination of the 
removal proceedings, arguing that his conviction was a hybrid offense under Nugent v. 
Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2004).  A hybrid offense is an offense described by two 
of § 1101(a)(43)‟s definitions, and thus must meet the requirements of both in order to be 
an “aggravated felony.”  Corporan conceded that his was an offense involving fraud or 
deceit under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), but he argued that it was also a theft offense under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(G), which requires a one-year prison sentence. 
 The IJ agreed that Corporan‟s was a hybrid offense under Nugent and determined 
that he was not removable because his conviction did not include the requisite one-year 
prison sentence under § 1101(a)(43)(G).  As such, the IJ explained that “[t]he issue of 
whether respondent‟s fraud conviction resulted in the loss of more than $10,000[] need 
not be resolved.”   
 On appeal, the BIA overturned the IJ‟s decision, determining that Nugent did not 
apply.  The BIA held that Corporan was convicted of an offense involving fraud and 
deceit with a loss of $10,000 and “[he] is removable.”  On remand, the IJ ordered 
Corporan removed.   
 Corporan filed this petition for review, arguing that: (1) his offense was a hybrid 
offense under Nugent; and (2) in any event, the BIA erred by concluding that his offense 
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involved a loss of $10,000, as this is a factual finding that must be made by the IJ in the 
first instance. 
II.
1
    
 Corporan‟s first argument is now foreclosed.  In Al-Sharif v. United States Citizen 
and Immigration Services, ___ F.3d ___, No. 12-2767, 2013 WL 4405689 (3d Cir. Aug. 
19, 2013) (en banc), we rejected Nugent‟s hybrid theory.  Any “offense that „involves 
fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000‟ is an aggravated felony 
under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) regardless of whether it also meets the requirements of some 
other subparagraph [of § 1101(a)(43)].”  Id. at *4.  At the Court‟s request, the parties 
filed letter responses to Al-Sharif, and agree that Corporan‟s first allegation of error is not 
a viable ground for relief. 
 As to the loss amount—Corporan‟s second alleged error—the BIA erred by 
making a factual determination after the IJ explicitly declined to do so.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (“[T]he Board will not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding 
appeals. . . . If further factfinding is needed in a particular case, the Board may remand 
the proceeding . . . .”).  The loss to the victim under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) is a 
“circumstance-specific” calculation, Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 
                                              
1
 We lack jurisdiction to review a removal order if the alien was convicted of an 
aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), but have jurisdiction to determine our 
jurisdiction, that is, to determine whether the petitioner was convicted of an aggravated 
felony.  Stubbs v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 251, 253 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006).  The Government 
argues that Corporan failed to exhaust the amount-of-loss issue because he did not raise it 
to the BIA after the IJ entered the removal order.  We disagree.  Under Popal v. 
Gonzales, we have jurisdiction to review an IJ‟s order that is “a mere ministerial act, 
taken to effectuate the unmistakable judgment of the BIA.”  416 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 
2005).     
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2010), which is determined by fact finding, see Singh v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 503, 513 
(3d Cir. 2012) (considering evidence of loss amount); In re Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
306, 319 (B.I.A. 2007) (same).   
Thus, we grant the petition as to the loss amount, vacate the removal order, and 
remand to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for a factual finding on this 
issue.
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 Reflecting the unusual posture of this case, our order vacates the final administrative 
order entered by the IJ.  However, as is our practice, we remand to the BIA.  See Popal, 
416 F.3d at 255 n.6.  The Government‟s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Remand are 
denied as moot.  
